Civil conflicts vary dramatically in how quickly they reach the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—some arrive within days, others take years or never appear. This study addresses the neglected question of what determines the Council’s agenda‑setting speed.

🔍 How the argument explains agenda speed

A new theoretical framework integrates realist and constructivist insights with institutionalist and bargaining perspectives to explain variation in agenda-setting speed. Key mechanisms include:

• The parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5)
• Normative pressures and concerns for the Council’s organizational mission
• The preferences of the elected members (E-10)
• Preference heterogeneity within both the P-5 and the E-10

📊 New dataset and survival analysis

• An original dataset of civil conflicts and their timing relative to inclusion on the UNSC agenda
• Survival analysis is applied to model how long it takes conflicts to reach the Council

⚖️ Key findings

• The parochial interests of the P-5 matter, but they do not unilaterally determine agenda‑setting speed.
• P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and by concerns tied to the Council’s mission when conflict severity rises—specifically spillover effects and civilian casualties.
• The interests of the often-overlooked E-10 shape timing as well.
• Greater preference heterogeneity among both P-5 and E-10 members slows or complicates agenda access.

🌍 Why this matters

The results refine understanding of how the UN functions in crisis response and highlight conditions that affect the Security Council’s legitimacy. By showing that institutional norms, conflict severity, elected-member influence, and intra-group diversity all shape agenda speed, the study informs both scholarly accounts of international institutions and debates about UN effectiveness.