📊 What Evidence Was Collected

Experimental work shows that decision makers with proposal power are often held responsible for collective decisions. Building on that insight, extensive cross-national survey data from 1988–2010 across 28 democracies was used to trace how voters assign responsibility for economic outcomes in coalition governments.

🧭 How the Question Was Tested

Voter heuristics typically concentrate economic blame on single parties—most often the Prime Minister's party. This research probes whether the Finance Minister's party can also attract the economic vote when coalition context and signaling make its agenda power visible. The empirical approach combines:

• A broad survey record (1988–2010) covering 28 democracies to measure patterns of responsibility attribution and economic voting.
• Online survey experiments in Ireland and the Netherlands that manipulate cues about policy ownership and compartmentalization.

💡 Key Findings

• Voters identify the Finance Minister party as responsible for economic outcomes when coalition arrangements exaggerate its perceived agenda power.
• When parties take clear ownership of particular policy areas and decision-making is compartmentalized, voters treat the Finance Minister as having proposal power, and that party receives a larger economic vote.
• Conversely, when coalition context mutes perceived agenda power, the Finance Minister is less likely to be held responsible.
• Online experiments confirm that respondents use compartmentalization signals to identify—and punish—coalition parties with proposal power.

🔎 Why It Matters

These results show that responsibility attribution in coalition governments is context-dependent: the economic vote does not always default to the Prime Minister's party. Instead, institutional roles and signaling about policy ownership can shift voter blame (and reward) to coalition partners—especially finance ministers—by making their proposal power salient.