NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials of Poltical Analysis 7e | R Companion 4e | SPSS 7e | Stata 5e | Excel 1e 🎡
NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials 7e | R Companion 4e | SPSS 7e | Stata 5e | Excel 1e 🎡
NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials 7e | More Textbooks 🎡
If this link is broken, please
You can also
(will be reviewed).

When Markets Falter, Asset Owners Turn Away From the Right

πŸ” The Question: Do owners of financial assets always back right-wing parties and a trimmed welfare state? Conventional accounts say yes: financial assets push investors toward conservative parties because right-wing policies are believed to generate higher returns, and wealth reduces demand for welfare since private assets substitute for social benefits. This study challenges that view by asking whether market turmoil changes those preferences.

πŸ”Ž What Was Compared: Empirical comparisons focus on how support for right-wing parties shifts during episodes of financial-market uncertainty in places with varying concentrations of private financial wealth.

  • Illustrative episodes include: the dot-com bubble burst, the 2008 financial crisis, and the market shock from the coronavirus pandemic β€” all examples where savings can evaporate quickly.

πŸ“Œ Key Findings:

  • Owners of financial assets become less attracted to free-market, right-wing policy offerings when financial markets are uncertain.
  • During periods of market turmoil, support for right-wing parties falls in areas with high levels of financial assets.

⚑ Why It Matters: These results qualify common assumptions linking asset ownership to stable conservative preferences and lower demand for welfare. Political preferences among the financially wealthy are context-dependent: market risk can push asset owners away from parties promising unfettered markets, with implications for theories of representation, welfare politics, and electoral behavior.

Comparative Political Studies
Patrimony at Risk: Market Uncertainty and Right-Wing Voting was authored by Anton BrΓ€nnlund. It was published in CPS in 2022. Find on Google Scholar10.1177/00104140211060267
Political Behavior subfield banner