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Why Democracy Can Increase Deforestation During Competitive Elections
Insights from the Field
Deforestation
Democratization
Elections
Satellite data
Public goods
Comparative Politics
AJPS
23 R files
3 Datasets
1 PDF
3 Text
48 Other
Dataverse
Democratization, Elections, and Public Goods: The Evidence from Deforestation was authored by Luke Sanford. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2023.

Over the past three decades, competitive elections are linked to higher rates of forest loss. Forest protection is a long-term public good, while clearing provides short-term private benefits that can be delivered to targeted voters. In contested races, politicians appear to trade access to forested land—for small-scale farming or timber use—for electoral support, producing measurable increases in deforestation.

🛰️ Mapping Forest Loss With Satellites and Election Returns

  • Satellite-generated global forest cover data paired with the results of over 1,000 national-level elections between 1982 and 2016.
  • The analysis exploits temporal variation in democratization, election years, and margins of victory to estimate political effects on annual forest-cover change.

🔎 Key Findings

  • Countries that undergo a democratic transition lose an additional 0.8 percentage points of forest cover each year.
  • Years with close elections show over 1 percentage point per year higher forest cover loss compared to nonelection years.
  • A 10-point decrease in the margin of victory is associated with a 0.7 percentage point per year increase in deforestation.
  • These increases are on the order of 5–10 times the average global rate of forest loss.

⚖️ What This Implies

  • Democratization is associated with underprovision of an environmental public good—forests—rather than guaranteed improvements in environmental protection.
  • Contested elections appear to be a partial mechanism: electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to deliver short-term private benefits (access to forest resources) at the expense of long-term public goods.

🌍 Why It Matters

  • Findings challenge assumptions that democratization uniformly improves public-good provision and highlight a political channel that can produce substantial environmental harm.
  • Results inform scholars and policymakers seeking to design institutions that protect long-term environmental assets from short-run electoral pressures.
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