International demands for economic liberalization often create a compensation dynamic in autocracies.

• When faced with pressure, autocrats may promise reforms to appease international actors.

• This creates tension because economic liberalization threatens the interests of domestic elites who benefit from state control and patronage networks.

• These elites fear losing political power if deregulation undermines their clientelistic support base.

• To counter this threat, they push dictators to strengthen repression as compensation for potential losses.

This dynamic emerges only when autocrats perceive rebellion by elites as a genuine risk.

When the balance of power favors weak or unorganized elites who cannot threaten regime survival,

dictators can implement liberalization reforms without needing such compensatory measures.

• Statistical analyses across global autocracies demonstrate that economic liberalization correlates with increased repression under these conditions.

This finding highlights how seemingly reform-oriented international engagements might paradoxically reinforce authoritarian control.