NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials of Poltical Analysis 7e | R Companion 4e | SPSS 7e | Stata 5e | Excel 1e 🎵
NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials 7e | R Companion 4e | SPSS 7e | Stata 5e | Excel 1e 🎵
NOW AVAILABLE: Essentials 7e | More Textbooks 🎵
If this link is broken, please
You can also
(will be reviewed).

Compensating Autocrats: International Economic Pressure Intensifies Repression

International demands for economic liberalization often create a compensation dynamic in autocracies.

  • When faced with pressure, autocrats may promise reforms to appease international actors.
  • This creates tension because economic liberalization threatens the interests of domestic elites who benefit from state control and patronage networks.
  • These elites fear losing political power if deregulation undermines their clientelistic support base.
  • To counter this threat, they push dictators to strengthen repression as compensation for potential losses.

This dynamic emerges only when autocrats perceive rebellion by elites as a genuine risk.

When the balance of power favors weak or unorganized elites who cannot threaten regime survival,

dictators can implement liberalization reforms without needing such compensatory measures.

  • Statistical analyses across global autocracies demonstrate that economic liberalization correlates with increased repression under these conditions.

This finding highlights how seemingly reform-oriented international engagements might paradoxically reinforce authoritarian control.

International Studies Quarterly
Compensating Autocratic Elites: How International Demands for Economic Liberalization Can Lead to More Repressive Dictatorships was authored by Jose Kaire. It was published in ISQ in 2019. Find on Google Scholar10.1093/isq/sqz013
International Relations subfield banner