Civil wars often end with power-sharing deals designed to stabilize the state.📏 These agreements typically involve constitutional arrangements that distribute authority among former combatants and other groups. This article argues these measures help establish judicial independence in post-conflict societies by reducing political tensions around legal institutions, thereby encouraging greater commitment to rule of law implementation among political actors. Analyzing post-war settlement cases from 1948-2006 across several continents reveals that power-sharing mechanisms directly address the insecurities felt by judges and politicians during transition periods. This targeted approach improves long-term prospects for judicial autonomy and legal system development.

Case Studies, 1948–2006📏 - Examined diverse post-conflict contexts including:

• States emerging from African civil conflicts (e.g., Sierra Leone)
• Rebuilding efforts in Asia-Pacific nations after internal strife
• Post-communist transitions across Eastern Europe following war periods
• Long-term analysis of Middle Eastern peace accords with embedded legal reforms

Key Findings📏

• Power-sharing deals create institutional constraints that promote judicial independence
• These agreements foster security among political actors, enhancing commitment to legal processes
• The positive relationship between power sharing and rule-of-law development is statistically significant across all analyzed cases

This research demonstrates how carefully designed post-conflict institutions can directly influence the trajectory of governance reforms.