Political corruption persists despite international organizations' efforts.
The article examines how IO membership influences corruption dynamics among nations.
It proposes a nuanced argument: the impact of cooperation depends on fellow members' integrity.
Key Findings:
- Incredible Punishment: Corrupt states within an IO may not enforce anti-corruption norms against each other, making punishment ineffective and incredible.
- Lack of Credible Commitment: This ineffectiveness stems from weak commitment to shared governance standards.
Imitation Effects:
- Leaders observe their corrupt counterparts in the same organization adopting such practices,
- And may rationalize similar behavior, normalizing unethical conduct.
Implications
The research demonstrates that:
- Countries joining IOs with other corrupt members significantly increase their own corruption rates over time.
Methodology:
- Analyzed diverse data sources including new information on IO anti-corruption mandates,
- Employed various estimation strategies to validate findings.
