## Political corruption persists despite international organizations' efforts.

The article examines how IO membership influences corruption dynamics among nations.

It proposes a nuanced argument: the impact of cooperation depends on fellow members' integrity.

Key Findings:

* Incredible Punishment: Corrupt states within an IO may not enforce anti-corruption norms against each other, making punishment ineffective and incredible.

* Lack of Credible Commitment: This ineffectiveness stems from weak commitment to shared governance standards.

Imitation Effects:

* Leaders observe their corrupt counterparts in the same organization adopting such practices,

* And may rationalize similar behavior, normalizing unethical conduct.

### Implications

The research demonstrates that:

* Countries joining IOs with other corrupt members significantly increase their own corruption rates over time.

Methodology:

* Analyzed diverse data sources including new information on IO anti-corruption mandates,

* Employed various estimation strategies to validate findings.