Election timing is a strategic tool for incumbent parties, but conventional wisdom often overlooks one key mechanism: surprise. This article argues that incumbents gain an edge not just from favorable economic conditions, but by catching opponents off guard.

* Data & Methods

Using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955-2017), the author analyzes both scheduled and unexpected elections to test this hypothesis. Fixed-effects models complement analyses of exogenously timed by-elections, ensuring robust findings.

* Key Findings

Surprise elections significantly disadvantage opposition parties across multiple dimensions:

* Fewer candidates recruited for key positions.

* Lower-quality candidate selection overall.

* Reduced campaign spending budgets.

* Poorer coordination among opposition candidates.

These factors translate to fewer votes and seats won by the opposition.

* Real-World Relevance

The study demonstrates that surprise timing is most effective in shorter campaigns and yields stronger benefits when facing inter-party rather than intra-party competition. This adds crucial nuance to our understanding of how incumbents can strategically undermine electoral accountability.