In parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, how do ministerial portfolios influence party preferences and government accountability? This study analyzes over 2000 social and economic reforms across nine Western European nations during two decades (1995-2014), drawing on original data from country reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit and OECD. The findings reveal a clear contrast: strong parliamentary oversight mechanisms effectively limit how much power parties can use to set policy agendas but have less impact on controlling ministerial gatekeeping functions.
Data & Methods
* Analyzed over 2000 social/economic reforms across nine Western European countries (1995-2014)
* Used original coding data from Economist Intelligence Unit and OECD reports
Key Findings
Strong parliamentary oversight constrains the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties
Does not significantly affect gatekeeping functions or ministerial discretion
Our results demonstrate that institutional arrangements can shape government output differently depending on whether they target agenda setting (policy initiation) versus implementation control (gatekeeping). This has direct implications for understanding democratic accountability and policy-making processes in multi-party systems.
| Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies was authored by Hanna Bäck, Wolfgang C. Müller, Mariyana Angelova and Daniel Strobl. It was published by Sage in CPS in 2022. |
