# Core Argument

This article examines how political institutions emerged under European colonial rule by analyzing a critical paradox. While settlers' organizational strength allowed them to demand representative governance, their democratic ambitions were constrained by the metropole's historical commitment to representation.

New Data on Colonial Legislatures

I analyze newly compiled data covering 144 colonies across Africa, the British Caribbean, and the US South between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. This dataset reveals that only British settler colonies—those originating from a metropole with established representative institutions—consistently developed early elected legislative representation.

## Hypothesis One: The Metropole's Influence

The first hypothesis explains why European settlers in other colonial contexts did not achieve similar democratic outcomes despite their organizational power. It posits that the absence of a metropole with a strong tradition of representative government significantly hindered these colonies' path toward early electoral representation.

## Hypothesis Two: Democratic Contradictions and Settler Minorities

The second hypothesis focuses on the core tension in those colonies that did establish early representative institutions. Drawing from class-based democratization theories, it demonstrates how powerful European settler minorities often became entrenched as a landed class, creating institutional roadblocks to broader democratic participation.

## Institutional Evidence Supports Contradictions

Data examining voting restrictions and legislature disbandment across these regions confirms the presence of resisted enfranchisement and contestation backsliding. These findings directly challenge the notion that early representative institutions necessarily led toward full democracy, supporting instead a 'Dahlian path'—a trajectory from competitive oligarchy to complete democracy—that did not apply uniformly across all colonial contexts.