New democracies often face pressure from former authoritarian elites, who threaten exposure of past secret collaborations unless politicians agree to their demands. This study argues that lustration policies—revealing such collaborations—can prevent this blackmail by enabling elected representatives to be responsive to constituents without fear of retribution. Our analysis shows the effectiveness of lustration depends on its severity and whether revealing information would harm dissidents-turned-politicians.

Data & Methods:

Using original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset (covering 84 post-1946 democratic transitions), we test this theory through rigorous quantitative methods, including regression analyses.

Key Findings:

• Lustration reduces blackmail by former elites unless dissidents face severe consequences for exposure.

• The potential for blackmail increases as the ideological distance between politicians and authoritarian elites grows smaller.

Why It Matters:

This research underscores how transitional justice mechanisms can influence democratic responsiveness, revealing crucial dynamics in post-authoritarian political transitions.