Party systems in modern democracies appear robust due to a dynamic interplay between entropy and structure.
The Core Model:
We theorize electoral competition as emerging from the tension between idiosyncratic voting (entropy) guided by individual evaluations, versus coordinated party preference based on objective political structures.
Our framework places determinants of partisan identity along a spectrum connecting subjective experiences with structural frameworks. While entropy is pervasive in everyday politics, elections for national executive positions periodically amplify objective concerns, effectively resetting the balance and reinforcing existing party systems.
How We Tested It:
We examined pseudo-randomized survey data from European Election Studies spanning 1989-20XX. This analysis revealed a distinct cyclical pattern tied to major electoral events.
The Broader Implication:
Interestingly, feedback mechanisms differ significantly across party systems of varying sizes. These different institutional contexts foster unique stable equilibria in how parties organize and compete electorally.
| A Behavioral Theory of Electoral Structure was authored by Till Weber and Mark Franklin. It was published by Springer in Pol. Behav. in 2018. |
