The introduction of impeachment resolutions against presidents in Argentina and Brazil often seems puzzling, as many fail to succeed. This study explores two main hypotheses: one suggests legislators use these resolutions primarily for oversight purposes, even if they know success is unlikely, thereby weakening presidential approval rates through exposure of misconduct.

This may not be the only reason; alternatively, impeachment motions are frequently introduced in response to external factors that directly impact public sentiment—specifically corruption scandals or economic downturns—which diminish presidential popularity among their constituents.

To test these competing ideas about legislative behavior and its political consequences, we analyzed 274 impeachment resolutions from Argentina and Brazil since democratization. Using time-series approaches combined with regression discontinuity estimators alongside standard statistical models,

we examined how introducing such measures affects approval ratings over time.

Our findings strongly support the second hypothesis: legislators primarily introduce these resolutions to represent their constituents' grievances during periods of exogenous discontent.