New scholarship argues for recentering interest groups in American politics research. This paper explores their influence through bureaucratic boards governing public pensions, which have significant financial consequences for states, public workers, and taxpayers.
Our Approach
We analyze governance structures typically granting official policymaking authority to union-backed interests.
Key Challenges
These institutions grapple with quantitative decision-making that affects government finances significantly.
Potential Problems
* The study reveals how interest groups gain influence by serving as 'official' participants in pension fund governance.
* This inside access may weaken effective government through union dominance.
Why It Matters
Future research should examine variations across agencies, different governance structures, and the broader implications for understanding group power in American politics.
| Interest Groups on the Inside: The Governance of Public Pension Funds was authored by Sarah F. Anzia and Terry M. Moe. It was published by Cambridge in POP in 2019. |
