Why Do States Privatize Their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation

The United States has privatized various government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often link prison privatization primarily to ideological commitments to small government or fiscal pressures.

However, this paper argues these factors are secondary. Instead, state prison privatization emerges as an unintended outcome of administrative burdens and legal costs stemming from inmate litigation.

Using a newly compiled database tracking U.S. prison privatization trends,

we demonstrate that exposure to inmate litigation significantly drives privatization decisions across states, regardless of their ideological leanings.

This finding contradicts common narratives about the primary motivations behind this controversial trend.

Implications:

Private prisons provide a mechanism for state corrections departments to manage legal pressures more effectively. Litigation often forces costly administrative changes that private management can circumvent or handle differently than public systems.

Our analysis suggests policymakers should consider how inmate lawsuits shape correctional policies, not just ideological factors.

The relationship between litigation and privatization reveals complex unintended consequences of what appear to be direct policy choices.