Strategic Alliances: How Rebel Groups Defect via Temporary Partnerships

Negotiated peace settlements often fail due to rebel defections. This study investigates why, revealing that rebels form strategic alliances—a pathway previously overlooked—to defect more easily than individual actions suggest.

Case Study Focus:

• Analyzes Uganda's failed peace process (1975–2015)
• Illustrates how excluded groups lower the opportunity cost for splinter factions
• Shows rebel elites prefer temporary alliances over surrender under unfavorable conditions

Causal Pathway Evidence:

Using large-N qualitative analysis of causal process observations from Sub-Saharan Africa:

• Finds defection-by-alliance is significantly more common than previously thought
• Reveals this pathway accounts for >1/3 of all defections in the sample
• Highlights shared incentives as a key driver making alliances strategically viable

Implications & Takeaways:

This research shows strategic alliances are not just anomalies, but prevalent pathways to defecting peace agreements. The findings demonstrate that temporary partnerships help rebel groups minimize costs while maximizing gains from exiting negotiated settlements.