This article demonstrates that legislative redistricting enhances rather than diminishes American representative democracy.

The authors resolve two long-standing controversies in political science. First, they show that while partisan gerrymandering protects incumbents—who are often from the controlling party—it paradoxically increases electoral responsiveness to voter preferences across the board.

Second, regarding partisan bias in elections, the study finds a nuanced reality: redistricting by one party biases the system compared to if another party controlled it;

however, relative to an election system without any redistricting at all,

gerrymandering actually reduces overall partisan bias. This seemingly contradictory finding stems from oversimplified assumptions about redistricters' goals and flawed statistical methods.

💡 Key Findings:

• Redistricting increases responsiveness despite protecting incumbents

• Partisan gerrymandering creates bias but is less extreme than no redistricting at all

• Methodological flaws in previous studies explain their contradictory conclusions

🔑 Why It Matters:

This research clarifies the role of partisan control over redistricting and offers a more nuanced understanding of how electoral systems function under real-world conditions.