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Short Durability? Parliament Boosts Spending Ahead

Cabinet DurabilityFiscal DisciplineEuropean DemocraciesBudget DeficitEuropean Politics@APSR1 R file2 Stata files1 datasetDataverse
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New model suggests Cabinet Expectations shape fiscal behavior.

* Problem: Standard political budget cycle models assume fixed election timing.

* Solution: This research introduces a revised framework allowing cabinets to anticipate their tenure length. Cabinets then strategically adjust spending based on these predictions.

Key Findings:

* Longevity Expectations: Governments spend more as their predicted term ends, regardless of actual duration.

* Surprise Survival: Cabinets that unexpectedly survive beyond projections run larger deficits later.

Empirical Evidence: Data from 15 European democracies over multiple decades confirms these patterns. Spending increases align with waning expected cabinet life, and deficits rise when cabinets outlive predictions.

Broader Implications: This nuanced understanding reveals how beliefs about political survival influence budgetary decisions in parliamentary systems.

Article card for article: Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline
Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline was authored by David Fortunato and Matt W. Loftis. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2018.
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American Political Science Review