In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Peru, the Spanish Crown sold colonial provincial governorships. This paper analyzes this unique dataset to understand how appointment criteria influenced long-term development outcomes.

• Price of Colonial Governance: Examines prices as a measure tied to corruption quality during Spain’s colonial period in South America.

• Exogenous Variation: Uses shifts in European warfare timing as an external factor affecting who was appointed governor, allowing for clearer causal analysis by minimizing internal biases within the system.

• Key Findings: Shows provinces with higher extraction potential (like mining resources) commanded higher prices and attracted governors perceived negatively. These expensive appointments are linked to lower household consumption, less schooling access, and reduced public good provision in modern times.

• Governor Impact: Further analysis suggests specific governor characteristics worsened political conflict among inhabitants post-independence or during the colonial period itself.

• Institutional Consequences: Identified governor types also damaged institutional trust across society over time.

The study concludes that exogenous appointment criteria enabled researchers to link higher prices with worse governance outcomes, ultimately harming long-term development in Peru.