Stalin's coercive agricultural policy, known as 'Terror by Hunger,' caused widespread starvation in Ukraine during 1932-1934. This study investigates its political legacy using micro-level data on eight decades of local behavior.
### Data & Methods
* Eight decades (post-1950s) of rich micro-level data tracking local communities' political actions.
* Analysis focuses specifically on Ukraine's response to the famine policy.
### Key Findings
* Under Threat: Communities exposed to famine exhibited greater loyalty toward Moscow when faced with credible repression threats later.
* Without Threat: When Moscow could no longer credibly threaten retribution, these communities showed more opposition than comparable areas.
### Why It Matters
This research demonstrates the dual impact of mass repression:
* It can deter dissent through credible punishment mechanisms.
* But lack of ongoing threat allows past victims to express latent opposition later.
The famine in Ukraine thus serves as a powerful case study illustrating how extreme coercive policies shape long-term political behavior, revealing that repressive tactics themselves may not be the only source of political loyalty.
| Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger' was authored by Arturas Rozenas and Yuri Zhukov. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2019. |
