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Repression's Paradox: How Moscow's Famine Strategy Shaped Loyalty in Ukraine

Stalin's coercive agricultural policy, known as 'Terror by Hunger,' caused widespread starvation in Ukraine during 1932-1934. This study investigates its political legacy using micro-level data on eight decades of local behavior.

Data & Methods

  • Eight decades (post-1950s) of rich micro-level data tracking local communities' political actions.
  • Analysis focuses specifically on Ukraine's response to the famine policy.

Key Findings

  • Under Threat: Communities exposed to famine exhibited greater loyalty toward Moscow when faced with credible repression threats later.
  • Without Threat: When Moscow could no longer credibly threaten retribution, these communities showed more opposition than comparable areas.

Why It Matters

This research demonstrates the dual impact of mass repression:

  • It can deter dissent through credible punishment mechanisms.
  • But lack of ongoing threat allows past victims to express latent opposition later.

The famine in Ukraine thus serves as a powerful case study illustrating how extreme coercive policies shape long-term political behavior, revealing that repressive tactics themselves may not be the only source of political loyalty.

American Political Science Review
Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger' was authored by Arturas Rozenas and Yuri Zhukov. It was published in APSR in 2019. Find on Google Scholar10.1017/S0003055419000066
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