This study investigates how social networks shape political accountability in Mexico.
Context: We leverage a field experiment where providing information about incumbent malfeasance paradoxically increased support for those incumbents, even when voters maintained negative beliefs about them.
Mechanism: By combining this intervention with detailed family network data, we reveal that increased social connectedness actually strengthened voter coordination around these incumbents, rather than against them. This challenges conventional wisdom by demonstrating how networks can buffer the impact of accountability information.
Findings: The experiment shows that voters in highly connected precincts used provided malfeasance information strategically to coordinate support for less offensive challenger parties. Individual-level data confirms networks facilitated both explicit and tacit coordination strategies among voters.
Implications: Our results suggest social networks may undermine voter accountability by enabling strategic responses to negative political information.
| Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks was authored by Eric Arias, Pablo Balan, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall and Pablo Querubin. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2019. |
