This article examines how fairer elections influence democratic responsiveness through novel experimental designs and data on Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana. Using a unique quasi-experiment from the 2012 election where constituencies were randomly assigned to varying levels of election-day monitoring, we find that intensive monitoring increased CDF spending by incumbents by nearly 20 percentage points during their terms. While all types of candidates entered parliament equally, the findings suggest this effect stems not from changing who is elected but motivating incumbents through electoral sanction expectations.

New Insights Into:

* Experimental Design & Data Source: Ghana's 2012 election; Randomized assignment of constituency monitoring teams (intensive vs. light); Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending records;

* Key Findings: Incumbents in intensively monitored constituencies spent significantly more CDF funds (+19 pp);

* Causal Mechanism & Implications: Motivation through fear of electoral sanctions; No change in parliamentary representation/quality; Enhanced democratic accountability via improved responsiveness.