In parliamentary democracies, chief executives wield the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite extensive research on election timing, dissolution's strategic role in policymaking remained largely unexplored.
## Legislative Bargaining in Shadow of Dissolution
This study develops and empirically tests a theoretical model explaining how executive dissolution threats influence legislative bargaining outcomes.
We demonstrate that executives strategically deploy dissolution power to shape policy decisions during negotiations.
### Key Findings & Data Insights
* Executive Influence: Chief executives' threat effectiveness depends on their current public support levels.
* Legislative Strength: The legislature's bargaining position affects how responsive executives are with dissolution threats.
* Electoral Timing: The proximity to constitutionally mandated elections significantly impacts the use and perceived credibility of these threats.
### Political Relevance & Model Contribution
By analyzing a novel time-series dataset from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, our research provides crucial insights into executive-legislative dynamics under dissolution risk.
| Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining was authored by Michael Becher and Flemming Juul Christiansen. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2015. |
