In parliamentary democracies, chief executives wield the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite extensive research on election timing, dissolution's strategic role in policymaking remained largely unexplored.

## Legislative Bargaining in Shadow of Dissolution

This study develops and empirically tests a theoretical model explaining how executive dissolution threats influence legislative bargaining outcomes.

We demonstrate that executives strategically deploy dissolution power to shape policy decisions during negotiations.

### Key Findings & Data Insights

* Executive Influence: Chief executives' threat effectiveness depends on their current public support levels.

* Legislative Strength: The legislature's bargaining position affects how responsive executives are with dissolution threats.

* Electoral Timing: The proximity to constitutionally mandated elections significantly impacts the use and perceived credibility of these threats.

### Political Relevance & Model Contribution

By analyzing a novel time-series dataset from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, our research provides crucial insights into executive-legislative dynamics under dissolution risk.