In parliamentary democracies, chief executives wield the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite extensive research on election timing, dissolution's strategic role in policymaking remained largely unexplored.
Legislative Bargaining in Shadow of Dissolution
This study develops and empirically tests a theoretical model explaining how executive dissolution threats influence legislative bargaining outcomes.
We demonstrate that executives strategically deploy dissolution power to shape policy decisions during negotiations.
Key Findings & Data Insights
- Executive Influence: Chief executives' threat effectiveness depends on their current public support levels.
- Legislative Strength: The legislature's bargaining position affects how responsive executives are with dissolution threats.
- Electoral Timing: The proximity to constitutionally mandated elections significantly impacts the use and perceived credibility of these threats.
Political Relevance & Model Contribution
By analyzing a novel time-series dataset from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, our research provides crucial insights into executive-legislative dynamics under dissolution risk.
