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Beyond Rent-Seeking: How India's Rural Bureaucracy Suffers from Being Under-Resourced
Insights from the Field
Implementation Deficits
Bureaucratic Overload
India Survey
Electoral Accountability
Asian Politics
APSR
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The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India was authored by Aditya Dasgupta and Devesh Kapur. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2020.

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for this failure emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture — but what if there was another culprit? This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: officials are chronically under-resourced relative to their responsibilities.

* Why does this happen?

Drawing on survey data from rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries measuring daily activities, the research provides quantitative evidence of two key findings:

• Local bureaucrats with fewer resources struggle more with program implementation because they lack sufficient time for managerial tasks

• Resource allocation is influenced by political responsibility — clearer accountability leads to less investment in local bureaucracy.

* What does this mean?

The findings highlight a crucial gap between bureaucratic capacity and policy implementation, offering new insights into local governance challenges.

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