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Beyond Rent-Seeking: How India's Rural Bureaucracy Suffers from Being Under-Resourced

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for this failure emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture — but what if there was another culprit? This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: officials are chronically under-resourced relative to their responsibilities.

  • Why does this happen?

Drawing on survey data from rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries measuring daily activities, the research provides quantitative evidence of two key findings:

  • Local bureaucrats with fewer resources struggle more with program implementation because they lack sufficient time for managerial tasks
  • Resource allocation is influenced by political responsibility — clearer accountability leads to less investment in local bureaucracy.
  • What does this mean?

The findings highlight a crucial gap between bureaucratic capacity and policy implementation, offering new insights into local governance challenges.

American Political Science Review
The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India was authored by Aditya Dasgupta and Devesh Kapur. It was published in APSR in 2020. Find on Google Scholar10.1017/S0003055420000477
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