This study examines state-level collective bargaining policies and their impact on public sector labor unions.
Government subsidies can activate political constituencies in unexpected ways. We demonstrate that mandatory bargaining laws for public employees effectively provide organizational support to teachers' unions, lowering the costs of mobilizing members into political action rather than just redistributing resources or shaping individual perspectives.
Our analysis utilizes comprehensive data on US public school teacher political participation spanning 1956-2004. We exploit state variation in mandatory bargaining law enactment timing and identify increased contact from organized groups as a potential mobilization mechanism.
Regression analyses reveal that the passage of mandatory bargaining laws significantly increases subsequent political engagement among teachers across all states during this period.
These findings offer crucial insights into debates surrounding collective bargaining rights, demonstrating a previously unexamined mechanism where policies can strengthen interest group capacity.
| When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization was authored by Patrick Flavin and Michael Hartney. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2015. |
