Observational studies struggle to untangle how legislative proposals affect electoral outcomes due to confounding factors like political skill. This study leverages a unique natural experiment in the Canadian House of Commons, where non-cabinet members were randomly assigned the right to propose legislation via lottery.

Data & Methods:

* Examined election results following the lottery assignment of legislative proposal rights.

* Compared outcomes for legislators granted this right versus those not selected.

Key Findings:

* Incumbents from governing parties who won the right to propose a single piece of legislation gained an average 2.7 percentage points more in vote totals.

* This resulted in nearly a seven percent higher probability of winning re-election for these lucky incumbents.

The mechanism behind this success appears counterintuitive: the causal effect stems from increased likeability among constituents, not necessarily changes in policy effectiveness or direct political skill enhancement. These results provide strong experimental evidence that politicians' legislative actions can directly influence electoral outcomes.