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Electoral Incentives Fuel Polarizing Strategies in Congressional Representation

Congressional representation operates at two distinct levels. This article introduces new measures to examine how electoral incentives shape both individual and collective forms of representation.

First, we explore the dual nature of representative behavior—responsiveness to constituents versus position-taking—which influences home styles. We find that:

  • The electoral connection between representatives and their districts drives strategic choices.

Second, responsiveness manifests differently depending on partisan alignment:

  • Marginal representatives (those in districts dominated by the opposing party) emphasize appropriations to maintain local support.
  • Copartisan-aligned representatives focus more on position-taking, reflecting shared ideology with their base.

Third, when aggregated across all representatives, these divergent strategies create an artificial polarization of stated party positions. This explains why policy debates appear increasingly extreme despite balanced representation in some areas.

Our findings offer a new perspective on political discourse and suggest that partisan sorting within districts contributes significantly to observed polarization trends.

American Journal of Political Science
Appropriators Not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation was authored by Justin Grimmer. It was published in AJPS in 2013. Find on Google Scholar10.1111/ajps.12000
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