Beyond Perfect Agents: Elite Fears Fuel Democracy

Introduction

Conventional wisdom assumes authoritarian rulers act perfectly as agents for economic elites. However, this study examines a counterintuitive finding – under certain conditions of uncertainty about dictators' future behavior, these very elites may actually support democratization.

Methodology & Findings

This research introduces "elite uncertainty" as a novel causal mechanism impacting political transitions:

• Successor Uncertainty: Elite concerns regarding the specific policy direction an autocratic successor might take.
• Pool Heterogeneity Uncertainty: Elite worries stemming from diversity among would-be dictator types.

The study builds upon and tests these predictions through case studies of democratic transitions in Russia/China during 1980s-2000s, Nigeria (c. 1970s), Indonesia (end of Suharto era) and other contexts.

Implications

This research demonstrates that economic elites' support for democracy is not entirely foreclosed under dictatorship when faced with uncertainty about an autocratic successor's potential behavior.