Dissident violence indirectly harms civilians through government budgetary shifts to defense at the expense of social services. Using subnational data from Peru, this study demonstrates that soldier fatalities during budget negotiations drive a significant reduction in local health budgets (0.13 percentage points). These cuts result in increased infant mortality rates years later. The effect operates through decreased utilization of women's healthcare facilities and postnatal services.

Data & Methods:

• Subnational violence/budgeting data from Peru

• Analyzed period: 2008–2012

• Measured impact on local health budget shares during budget negotiation periods following soldier fatalities

Key Findings:

• One soldier fatality reduces local health budgets by 0.13 pp

• Health cuts predict an additional 76 infant deaths two years post-attack

• Effect driven by reduced women's use of health facilities and postnatal care services

Why It Matters:

This research reveals a budgetary mechanism through which security-focused governmental responses to violence paradoxically worsen social welfare outcomes. The findings highlight the complex trade-offs in resource allocation during periods of political instability.