New research reveals that economic crises do not inevitably lead to democratic transitions. The effect depends crucially on a country's economic structure.

When authoritarian regimes maintain high levels of state engagement in the economy, they shield themselves from crisis pressures by binding social forces through patrimonial networks. This arrangement protects elite interests tied to ruling families while supposedly cushioning popular sectors—until crises occur anyway.

The study finds that during economic downturns, business elites and ordinary citizens alike suffer losses when state capitalism falters. As a result, both groups become more likely to defect from or rebel against the regime:

* Business elites abandon autocratic asset protection strategies

* Citizens lose their economic safety nets through state-linked connections

* Defections by one class increasingly align with revolts by another

This convergence of interests creates potent conditions for democratic change.

Such patterns were observed in Spain, Italy, and Greece during recent financial crises. The findings suggest that states heavily penetrated by capital cannot indefinitely block democratic transitions.