New research examines why political parties form pre-electoral coalitions despite presidents being unbound by campaign promises once in office.
The Puzzle: Coalition partners make policy agreements publicly during campaigns, but cannot enforce them afterward. Yet Latin American quantitative analysis shows decreasing ideological distance between parties increases coalition likelihood.
Methodology: This study uses regression analysis on extensive data from Latin American electoral coalitions.
Key Findings: The research demonstrates two counterintuitive realities: (1) non-ideological "office-oriented" parties actively form these alliances, and (2) despite the lack of post-election enforcement mechanisms, parties still strategically enter into pre-electoral pacts. Bullet points summarizing findings:
* Parties form coalitions even when they cannot guarantee post-election policy outcomes
* Ideological proximity between partners is a major driver for coalition formation
* Non-programmatic political parties are fully engaged in strategic alliance-building
Implications: This "this means that" analysis suggests pre-electoral cooperation functions as descriptive representation or negotiation strategy within presidential systems, offering insights into comparative politics and institutional design.
| Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems? was authored by Marisa Kellam. It was published by Cambridge in BJPS in 2017. |
