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Domestic Observers Curbed Election Fraud and Violence - But Only When It Matters

Electoral Competitionobservers effectGhana 2012 election dataexperimental design methodAfrican Politics@BJPS1 R file2 datasetsDataverse
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New findings reveal how election monitors in Ghana's 2012 elections reshaped parties' manipulation tactics.

Data & Methods: Experimentation with polling station data from Ghana during the 2012 elections showed observers significantly reduced fraud and violence at monitored stations.

Key Findings: Parties reacted differently based on their electoral standing. In single-party strongholds, activists shifted fraud to unobserved locations, while in competitive areas, they moved violence away from observed sites.

Why It Matters: This study demonstrates the crucial role of local competition and organizational capacity in shaping political party responses to monitoring efforts during democratic elections.

These results highlight a strategic adaptation among political actors where manipulation strategies are consciously reshaped when facing external oversight. The findings underscore how even well-established parties modify their behavior under different electoral pressures.

Article card for article: Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies
Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies was authored by Joseph Asunka, Sarah Brierley, Miriam Golden, Eric Kramon and George Ofosu. It was published by Cambridge in BJPS in 2019.
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British Journal of Political Science
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