
Why Study Sanctions and Repression?
Reed M. Wood investigates a troubling paradox of modern foreign policy: economic sanctions are designed as a nonviolent alternative to military force, yet they may worsen human-rights conditions in the countries they target. The article asks whether and why imposing economic sanctions leads target governments to increase state-sponsored repression of civilians.
Theory: How Sanctions Encourage Repression
Drawing on public-choice and institutional-constraints literatures, Wood argues that sanctions destabilize incumbent rulers by threatening regime survival and the material foundations of elite support. Faced with that threat, incumbents respond instrumentally: they increase repression to shore up their core supporters, deter potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent.
Data and Approach: Cross-National Evidence, 1976–2001
Key Findings
What This Means for Policy and Scholarship
These findings underscore that sanctions can impose severe political, social, and physical costs on civilian populations and may undermine the human-rights objectives sponsors intend to promote. Wood’s study calls for rethinking how the international community designs and enforces sanctions—highlighting the need for mechanisms that reduce harm to civilians and better anticipate domestic political responses.

| A Hand Upon the Throat of a Nation: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001 was authored by Reed M. Wood. It was published by Oxford in ISQ in 2008. |