Local law enforcement behavior shifts around elections, with county sheriffs reducing traffic fines revenue during election years. Evidence shows a measurable electoral cycle in traffic enforcement that grows larger when races are competitive.
📊 Data and Research Design:
- Panel dataset covering 57 California county governments across four election cycles.
- Analysis compares per capita traffic fines revenue in election years versus nonelection years to identify election-related changes in enforcement revenue.
🔍 Key Findings:
- Per capita traffic fines revenue is 9% lower in election years than in nonelection years.
- The reduction in fines revenue is larger when the sheriff election is competitive, indicating that political pressure intensifies policy shifts.
- Results point to deliberate manipulation of traffic enforcement policy by county sheriffs during election cycles rather than random year-to-year variation.
📌 Why It Matters:
- Advances the political budget cycle literature by documenting opportunistic behavior among an understudied local office—county sheriffs.
- Informs debates about law enforcement reform and the fiscal pressures on local governments from growing reliance on fines and fees revenue.
- Suggests that electoral incentives can shape everyday enforcement practices with potential implications for public safety, equity, and local budgets.
