Does patronage boost or hinder governance? This article argues that patron-client networks can enhance bureaucratic performance. Specifically, it examines how city leaders' past political ties to provincial officials influence economic development. Using a novel dataset and method identifying these ties from promotion records between 2000-2011, we find strong evidence: mayors connected to their bosses deliver significantly faster growth.
Data & Methods:
Original panel data at the city level during 2000–2011
A new method identifying patronage ties from promotion histories
Key Findings:
- City leaders with informal ties to provincial officials show higher economic performance
- These connections appear to enhance implementation capacity rather than simply rewarding cronies
- The findings challenge simplistic views of clientelism as purely obstructive
Alternative Explanations Addressed:
✓ Vertical accountability concerns ruled out through robust controls
✓ Horizontal competition effects accounted for in the analysis
✓ Alternative explanations systematically tested and rejected
This suggests patronage networks serve important enabling functions. These insights highlight how informal political institutions shape bureaucratic effectiveness within authoritarian systems.
