This study examines whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to aid re-election chances.
Context: We analyzed over 1,200 welfare and tax austerity measures from thirteen Western European countries across twenty years.
Core Finding: Governments are less likely to introduce such measures as elections approach—a pattern previously documented in the literature. However, our analysis uncovers a counterintuitive twist: strategic timing—specifically postponing reforms until after an election—is most common among governments experiencing leadership change (new prime ministers).
Mechanism & Opportunity: We argue that minimal winning cabinets are best positioned to credibly shift blame for austerity onto the preceding government. This finding highlights how political opportunities and constraints interact.
Methodology: Our empirical analysis focused on identifying patterns in policy introduction timing relative to election dates.
This article advances understanding of electoral politics by directly analyzing tangible policy outputs.
| Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making: Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe was authored by Daniel Strobl, Mariyana Angelova, Hanna Bäck and Wolfgang C. Müller. It was published by Cambridge in BJPS in 2021. |
