
📌 The Puzzle
Dominant visions of representative democracy assume parties focus on contrasting issues during campaigns, producing a diverse political supply. However, empirical backing for that claim is scarce. Parties face weak incentives to leave potentially rewarding issues to rivals, and uncertainty about electorate preferences drives strategic monitoring of competitors.
🔍 The Argument
The logic proposed is straightforward: lacking precise knowledge of short-term voter preferences, parties watch rivals and adopt issues highlighted by opponents rather than ceding them. This dynamic produces patterned imitation across topics, creating what is called "tunnels of attention"—clusters of issues emphasized in tandem because parties follow one another.
📊 Data: Seven Democracies, Four Decades, All Issues
🔑 Key Findings
đź§Ş Robustness and Inference
đź’ˇ Why It Matters
This reconceptualization of issue attention challenges assumptions about programmatic diversity in modern democracies. If parties repeatedly import issues from rivals, then representation, agenda diversity, and theories of party competition require reevaluation: party supply may be more constrained and interdependent than previously thought.

| Tunnels of Attention. Reconsidering Issue Attention was authored by Emiliano Grossman and Isabelle Guinaudeau. It was published by Sage in CPS in 2025. |