
๐ Research Question and Theory
This study examines career concerns in Italian academia by modeling academic promotion as a contest. The theoretical framework uses the standard contest model formalized as a multiunit all-pay auction. In this framework, the following parameters determine academics' effort and output:
๐ Data: A New Publication Census and Institutional Features
Italian incentives operate primarily through promotion decisions, and appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated, relatively narrow scientific sectors. Those institutional features allow the payoff-relevant parameters to be measured with precision. The empirical analysis uses a newly constructed dataset that collects the journal publications of all Italian university professors.
๐งช Identification: Exploiting a 1999 Reform
Identification leverages variation from a reform introduced in 1999, parts of which affected different academics differently. That staggered impact provides exogenous variation in promotion rules, sector competitiveness, and the weight placed on publications for advancement.
โ๏ธ Key Findings
๐ Why It Matters
Linking contest theory to comprehensive publication data shows how promotion design and sector-level competitiveness shape academic output. The results imply that reforms changing the importance of publications or the intensity of competition can systematically reallocate effort across ability types, with potential consequences for hiring, promotion policy, and the distribution of academic productivity.

| Incentives and Careers in Academia: Theory and Empirical Analysis was authored by Stefano Verzillo, Daniele Checchi and Gianni De Fraja. It was published by MIT Press in RESTAT in 2021. |
