Government procurement isn't always competitive. This research examines partisan favoritism in U.S. federal contracts during 2003-2015.
Data & Methods:
New data on government contracts from 2003 to 2015 was analyzed using statistical methods to identify patterns of noncompetitive awarding and firm turnover.
Key Findings:
• Executive departments, especially those with more politicized structures at the office level, awarded significantly more noncompetitive contracts.
• There's evidence that politically responsive agencies show favoritism in battleground states during election cycles.
• A shift in White House party affiliation influenced contract outcomes only within highly politicized agency units.
Implications:
Agency designs limiting appointee representation reduce political favoritism, suggesting institutional structures matter for controlling partisan influence.
| Partisan Procurement: Contracting with the United States Federal Government, 2003-2015 was authored by Carl Dahlström, Mihály Fazekas and David E. Lewis. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2021. |
