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Why Connected Citizens Complain More in Authoritarian China

Political Economycitizen participationauthoritarian chinaresource mobilizationSurvey Datapublic service complaintsAsian Politics@Pol. Behav.4 R files1 Stata file5 datasetsDataverse
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Why Citizens Speak Up in Authoritarian China?

Political participation in nondemocratic settings carries risks and uncertainties. Lily L. Tsai and Yiqing Xu ask why some citizens nonetheless take the risky step of contacting authorities with complaints about public services. The paper tests whether informal ties to government actors help explain who speaks up when formal democratic channels are weak.

A New Resource: Political Connections

Building on the resource mobilization model—which highlights time, money, and civic skills as enablers of participation—the authors argue that political connections (close personal ties to someone working in government) function as an additional, context-specific resource. These ties can lower the perceived risks or increase the expected effectiveness of complaining in authoritarian settings.

Data and Methods

Tsai and Xu analyze data collected from both urban and rural areas in China to assess whether people with political connections are more likely to contact authorities about public service problems. The authors estimate multivariate models that control for conventional resources and demographic factors and subject their results to a series of robustness checks, including a sensitivity analysis designed to gauge how much unobserved confounding would be required to overturn the findings.

Key Findings

  • Individuals who report close personal ties to government workers are significantly more likely to contact authorities with complaints about public services.
  • This greater propensity to complain is not explained by higher levels of dissatisfaction with service provision: connected citizens are not more dissatisfied than others.
  • The relationship holds across urban and rural samples and survives alternative model specifications and sensitivity checks, making confounding or misspecification an unlikely sole explanation.

Why This Matters

The study highlights how informal networks shape political voice under authoritarianism: access to government insiders works as a distinct resource that facilitates participation even when institutions do not guarantee channels for complaint. The findings advance debates in political behavior and comparative politics about inequalities in political voice, the informal mechanisms of accountability, and how social ties can restructure who benefits from public services in nondemocratic contexts.

Article card for article: Outspoken Insiders: Political Connections and Citizen Participation in Authoritarian China
Outspoken Insiders: Political Connections and Citizen Participation in Authoritarian China was authored by Lily L Tsai and Yiqing Xu. It was published by Springer in Pol. Behav. in 2018.
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Political Behavior