Disaster responses are political, but can citizens make useful decisions that help other people? This study uses an experimental economic game that simulates disaster choices to test whether people are willing and able to prevent disasters for others when options are complex and vary in risk. The authors report that players paid to help, invested in learning, and could identify which options were most useful across conditions, suggesting that people sometimes make costly, useful decisions on behalf of others.
experimental economic games public goods context costly helping behavior
Data and methods
The study used laboratory-style experimental economic games designed to simulate disaster scenarios in which groups of players face a complex task and multiple reasonable options whose usefulness depends on the experimental condition. The abstract emphasizes that options varied in riskiness and that identifying the most useful option depended on condition; it also notes players could pay to acquire information about how best to help.
Main findings
According to the abstract, players in these experiments (1) paid to help others, (2) were able to identify which option was most useful across different experimental conditions, and (3) paid to learn how best to help. The authors present these results as evidence that, at least in some controlled situations, citizens can make useful and costly decisions to prevent others from experiencing disaster.
- Players exhibited willingness to incur costs to help others.
- Players sought and paid for information that improved their helping decisions.
