
Roll-call votes are central tools for studying legislative politics, but their representativeness remains questionable.
This article addresses two common defenses against concerns about roll-call sampling: its pervasiveness and the benign strategic incentives behind vote requests.
First, we analyze voting procedures across 145 chambers and find that roll calls are typically discretionary — meaning legislators decide when to use them. Second, we present a formal model showing how this method selection affects position-taking strategies.
Our findings reveal three key problems:
These results suggest that scholars must more carefully consider the relationship between roll-call data collection and substantive political phenomena. The analysis highlights significant gaps in current approaches to measuring legislative behavior.

| Roll Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics was authored by Caitlin Ainsley, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betul Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel and Dino Hadzic. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2020. |