This study investigates how having a public employee elected as a city council member affects municipal spending. Using close election outcomes in Finland’s open-list proportional system, researchers quantify an effect where one additional employed politician leads to about a 1% increase in local budgets.
Context: The analysis leverages within-party variation during tight races when the Finnish electoral mechanism allows for randomness. This provides strong evidence that employment background influences policy decisions.
Mechanism: The spending boost appears concentrated among the largest political party and varies significantly depending on which sector the employee represents.
Implication: These findings suggest elected officials with recent public sector experience gain valuable information, enabling them to shape local policies. This insight highlights how insider knowledge impacts governance outcomes.
| Public Employees As Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections was authored by Janne Tukiainen, Ari Hyytinen, Jaakko Merilainen, Tuuka Saarimaa and Otto Toivanen. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2018. |
