The 2014 Mexican Electoral Reform ended an eighty-year ban on reelection for legislators. This study uses a quasi-natural experiment approach to examine how this change affects political behavior.
Data & Methods
New transcripts from 6,890 legislative sessions across Mexico in the post-reform period provide unique insights into legislative activity. The author employs a difference-in-differences analysis on these extensive records.
Key Argument
Electoral accountability shapes legislation; politicians seeking reelection focus more attention and effort on particularistic policies—those offering direct electoral benefits to specific groups—which may be less representative of broader public interests.
New Evidence
The findings demonstrate that legislators shifted toward particularistic agendas after the reform. This change appears synchronized with Mexico's electoral cycle, particularly affecting those politicians focused on long-term political survival and career advancement rather than immediate re-election prospects.
| Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico was authored by Lucia Motolinia. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2021. |
