Did the timing of elections influence local economic development policies? We conducted a field experiment across over 3,000 U.S. municipalities to investigate this.
Method:
• Legally incorporated a consultancy firm and posed inquiries on behalf of a fictional investor seeking municipal incentives.
• Tested whether pre- or post-election periods affected the likelihood of local governments offering investment incentives.
Findings:
• Overall results showed no significant difference in incentive offers based on election timing. • However, analysis limited to manufacturing-focused municipalities suggests an effect does exist here.
• Additional observational insights indicate that executive elections and partisanship may correlate with these policies.
Why It Matters:
This research highlights the complex interplay between electoral politics and economic policy implementation at local levels.
| Electoral Institutions and Electoral Cycles in Investment Incentives: A Field Experiment on Over 3,000 U.S. Municipalities was authored by Nathan Jensen, Michael Findley and Daniel Nielson. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2020. |
