The study asks whether feedback systems in markets with information asymmetries work because trustworthy sellers self-select into markets with feedback, or because sellers change behaviour for reputational reasons. Using a field experiment on taxi rides, the authors present an experimental design intended to disentangle selection from reputation mechanisms and discuss the implications for policy on feedback mechanisms.
Data and methods
The authors report a field experiment based on 476 taxi rides across four taxi types. The abstract states the empirical approach explicitly as a field experiment and frames the analysis around separating selection effects (who enters markets with feedback) from reputation effects (how sellers behave when feedback exists).
Field experiment design Comparison of selection vs. reputation
Main findings
According to the abstract, the study finds “strong evidence for reputation effects but little support for self-selection effects.” The authors limit their claims to those observed patterns and discuss policy implications without asserting causal mechanisms beyond what the experimental design can support.
- Stronger support for reputational mechanisms than for sellers self-selecting into feedback-enabled markets.
- Analysis based on 476 rides and four taxi types, per the abstract.
