Why do some executives repress the press while others leave it free? This study tests whether two external constraints — courts that can rule against leaders and citizens who can vote them out — shape executives' decisions to attack media. Using a global panel covering executive-branch attacks on the press from 1949–2016, the authors evaluate whether judicial independence and electoral democracy reduce press attacks and whether these constraints substitute for one another.
Global panel data (175 countries, 1949–2016) Focus on courts and electoral accountability Measure: executive branch attacks on the press
Data and methods
The analysis uses panel data on executive-branch attacks on the press across 175 countries between 1949 and 2016. The authors examine variation in repression in relation to indicators of judicial capacity to issue adverse rulings and the extent to which citizens can remove leaders through elections. The abstract describes a cross-national longitudinal design but does not report specific estimation techniques or control variables in the abstract.
Main findings
According to the abstract, the authors find strong support for the argument that attacks on the press are less likely when courts can make adverse rulings and when citizens can vote leaders out of office. They also report evidence that these constraints can act as substitutes: the protective effect of judicial independence is stronger in less democratic contexts and diminishes as electoral democracy increases.
- Courts and electoral accountability are each associated with reduced executive attacks on media.
- The protective role of courts is especially important where electoral democracy is weaker.
