This article asks whether caretaker governments in parliamentary democracies truly preserve the policy status quo while waiting for new coalition governments to form. Using newly assembled, bill-level data from dozens of cabinets across Western Europe, the author proposes a timeframe-based political definition of the caretaking period and uses descriptive evidence to question the prevailing consensus that caretakers do not engage in policymaking. The piece also flags normative and practical concerns about caretaking rules and their role in coalition bargaining.
Bold methods note: timeframe-based political definition of caretaking period
Data highlight: original bill-level dataset covering 238 cabinets
Data and methods
The study relies on original data on government bills collected for 238 cabinets in 11 Western European countries. The author frames the caretaking episode as a specific stage in the coalition lifecycle and treats the analysis as descriptive evidence to evaluate the common assumption about policy stasis under caretakers. The abstract presents the approach as a proposal of a political/timeframe definition and descriptive examination rather than a formal causal test.
Main findings
The descriptive evidence in the article challenges the longstanding assumption that caretaker governments uniformly maintain the policy status quo. The abstract reports that this challenge motivates discussion of normative issues and the implications for practical caretaking rules and coalition bargaining.
- Uses bill-level administrative records across many cabinets as the principal empirical material.
- Frames caretaking as a definable stage in coalition formation and examines policy activity descriptively.
