Why do some ambitious, nonincremental reforms fail to change entrenched practices? This article develops a theory of discretionary implementation and applies it to Colombia’s ethnic land restitution program (2012–18). Using process tracing of novel datasets on administrative cases and judicial rulings plus in-depth interviews, the authors explain how routine administrative choices—specifically layering and conversion—can slow and narrow extraordinary reform in practice, producing outcomes that fall short of legislative intent.
Data and methods
The authors assemble novel administrative and judicial case datasets and conduct 14 in-depth interviews to reconstruct implementation processes. They rely on process tracing to link administrative actions and judicial rulings to the unfolding of restitution cases during 2012–18.
administrative cases and judicial rulings, process tracing, 14 in-depth interviews
Main findings
The study reports that the Santos administration used two discretionary tactics. First, layering—adding procedures or bodies—delayed case processing. Second, conversion—reinterpreting rules—curtailed judicial discretion. Together these actions, the authors argue, effectively undermined the restitution reform in implementation, despite the reform’s extraordinary legal scope.
- The administration delayed case processing via layering.
- It restricted judicial discretion through conversion, which reduced the reform’s practical impact.
