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Signaling By Signature: How International Opinions Influence Treaty Ratification Despite Domestic Veto Players

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Treaty signing is typically viewed as insignificant for international legal cooperation, but this paper reveals its crucial role in domestic political processes. We demonstrate that treaty signature matters significantly because it serves as a signal to domestic veto players about the importance of ratifying an agreement.

The Surprising Role of Signatures

The study argues that when multiple well-informed countries publicly sign an international treaty, their collective action conveys meaningful information to national decision-makers who may otherwise oppose the treaty. This signaling mechanism influences whether these domestic actors choose to ratify or reject it.

A Formal Model and Empirical Test

The research formalizes this argument using a two-level signaling game model. To test its validity, we analyzed data from 126 international environmental agreements (IEAs), examining the relationship between signatory characteristics and national ratification decisions.

Key Findings: The Weight of Knowledge

Our analysis shows that treaties are more likely to be ratified when their signatories include countries with high levels of general or issue-specific knowledge. This suggests that informed international engagement can overcome domestic resistance.

Implications for Political Science Research

The findings highlight the significance of symbolic political actions in shaping real-world outcomes, emphasizing how international norms and diplomatic efforts intersect with domestic politics.

Article card for article: Signaling By Signature: The Weight of International Opinion and Ratification of Treaties by Domestic Veto Players
Signaling By Signature: The Weight of International Opinion and Ratification of Treaties by Domestic Veto Players was authored by Hugh Ward, David Hugh-Jones and Karolina Milewicz. It was published by Cambridge in PSR&M in 2018.
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Political Science Research & Methods